Testing Waters
What we do know is that no matter how hard we push it, our actions are unlikely to make China give up its claims. By Senator Jim Molan.
All military operations should be considered cautiously and executed vigorously. One question that must be answered during a consideration of any military operation is “What happens next?”. This question is especially important to what are called Freedom of Navigation Operations, or FONOPS, in the South China Sea, and even more so right now. FONOPS themselves may not be that complicated but the short and long-term consequences can always be extreme.
Freedom of navigation is a crucial right and obligation under international law. The right to innocent passage is the basis of maritime navigation and of today’s prosperous state of the world. Many nations are in dispute over maritime borders, and often claims overlap. Countries in dispute can go to arbitration if they like, but often claims lay dormant.
But sometimes claimants act illegally to shut down sea lanes or inhibit innocent passage. That’s where FONOPS come in.
The US uses FONOPS to target disputed claims around the world, including those of many US partners and allies. FONOPS involve warships or military aircraft exercising the right of innocent passage in disputed areas by sailing or flying either in the general vicinity of the disputed feature or, even more dangerously, within the 12-nautical-mile territorial waters boundary.
The Trump administration has increased the tempo of FONOPS in the South China Sea near China-occupied features involving interlocking claims with many nations. Last year, the US Navy conducted at least eight publicly reported FONOPS, the most contentious near China’s seven artificial and militarised island bases.
This year so far, two instances are on the public record. US warships conducted FONOPS in January and in April, one near a disputed large artificial island in the Spratly group, the other a transit of the Taiwan Strait, which Beijing regards as internal waters. The US said that it “asserted navigational rights and freedoms consistent with international law”, claiming these FONOPS “challenged the restrictions on innocent passage”. On each occasion, China claimed they had “expelled a US warship” from Chinese waters and, in a previous incident, a Chinese warship actually forced a US warship to exit disputed areas by threatening to ram it. China’s claims in the South China Sea and towards Taiwan must be seen as a “core interest” for the Chinese Communist Party.
There has recently been strong pressure on Australia from the US to participate in joint FONOPS. Australia has a task group of five ships in the disputed areas carrying out exercises with a US fleet, and the Foreign Minister and Defence Minister have just returned from regular planned talks.
But there are no indications that an agreement to conduct FONOPS will emerge. Normally, if a US request has become public, then it is being seriously considered. The issues become “should we do it, how should be do it, and should we do it now?”.
If we sail outside the 12-nautical-mile territorial waters, then we are strongly indicating that we are not prepared to push the right of innocent passage to its logical limit, which would have to make us look weak and essentially acknowledges China’s sovereignty. The Chinese could do nothing and, as they normally do, claim that they have “ejected” the intrusion. What has been achieved?
If we push the right to the extent that we enter territorial waters, the Chinese might still decide to do nothing but the risk of conflict increases significantly. What we do know is that no matter how hard we push it, our actions are unlikely to make China give up its claims. More importantly, this does not stop China using those bases at some time in the future to restrict or stop all shipping through the area if they wish, and Australia depends on these sea lanes.
Should Australian ships participate in FONOPS with the US and hopefully with other regional nations, there would be contingency plans for the tactical reaction to any Chinese response. That is important but not the major issue. In a situation where all participants are armed to the teeth, where Chinese rhetoric is at an all-time high, when US political pressure is rampant and where Australia is vulnerable to Chinese actions either commercially or militarily due to lack of resilience and a military that is just starting a 10-year development program, we must be cautious. At present, it seems that all the real options are on the Chinese side. This is an advantage gained by our lack of effective action on its claims over many years.
No FONOPS are going to force the Chinese to give up their claims outside of war. A meek exercise of the right of innocent passage indicates weakness. But incursions into territorial waters are fabulously risky and seemingly no more decisive than other more distant incursions. And of course, China always has the ability to exercise control of wider areas across the South China Seas sea lanes if and when it is in its interests to do so. So FONOPS now, without a broader and more comprehensive strategy to promote freedom of navigation, get the region nowhere.
Part of that strategy was seen a few days ago when Australia stated that Chinese claims in the South China Sea were illegal. More will be needed — especially a unified regional position on territorial claims and dispute mechanisms.
Australia, our ally the US, and indeed any nation supporting freedom of navigation should confront China on the issue of the rule of law, but the government needs to consider very carefully if this is the time and the place to do it. An incident around FONOPS might be handled tactically by the military but military operations tend to go in the most unlikely strategic direction.
We had no real trouble invading Iraq and ousting Saddam Hussein, and even stabilising the country, but it was Iraq that had General David Petraeus asking his famous unanswered question: “Tell me how this ends.” That was a fair question then, and it is a fair question now in relation to China.